Doug Thorburn on Early-Stage Alcohol and Drug Addiction

Iraq: How An Alcoholic Triggered a War, Which Led to a Quagmire

Whether alcoholics are directly or indirectly responsible for catastrophes, the lies they tell can lead to many forms of tragedy, especially when politics is involved. The 2003 Iraq war and current ISIS disaster in Iraq is a classic example of a series of catastrophic events initiated indirectly by one alcoholic.

Excluding natural causes, my work indicates that alcohol and other-drug addicts are responsible for some 80% of human misery. Considering that only 10% of the population is afflicted with substance addiction, the disease affects others way out of proportion to its prevalence. These problems include everything from auto accidents and domestic violence to war and genocide.

Confirming this 80% figure is difficult because of how the disease works. While statistics for road fatalities show the cause was a driver under the influence in only about a third of cases, many instances of addiction are missed. In some, the particular drug isn’t tested in perpetrator or apparent victim; both may have contributed to the incident. In others the addict was between using episodes, when behavior is often worse than while under the influence. Other cases involve accidents for which the precipitating event was an alcoholic driver who drove in a way that caused other, unrelated parties to crash. When natural causes are eliminated, the true cause of road fatalities in arguably 80% of instances is substance addiction.

Studies cited in Drunks, Drugs & Debits: How to Recognize Addicts and Avoid Financial Abuse show domestic violence crimes are nearly always rooted in alcoholism. Cases of pre-meditated murder, on the other hand, aren’t so clear-cut. Only about half can clearly be traced to an addict. This figure is misleading because in order to plan, keep a clear head and commit the crime the addict, who can exhibit extraordinary self-control over use during the early stages of the disease, may intentionally stop using for a period of time. This is probably less true for unplanned crimes of passion, which can be more frequently traced to an addict. Unfortunately, those investigating and writing about these violent crimes don’t understand the relevance of addiction and, as a result, don’t mention its likelihood. Ann Rule wrote an autobiographical-biographical true crime book about serial killer Ted Bundy, after working alongside him in a crisis hotline center. Rule never considered the possibility that Bundy might be an alcoholic; when I asked her if she thought it relevant, she blew me off. Anthrax killer Bruce Ivins (TAR # 42) could be identified as an addict in only one news article of a dozen I read after his suicide—in the 28th paragraph.

Other than my work, especially TAR, little has been written on the link between addiction and war—authorized murder on a massive scale. Yet it’s probable that those who precipitate international conflict are as likely to be substance addicts as those who commit domestic abuse. Non-addiction aware writers don’t understand cause and effect—that addiction is almost always the root cause of egomania, which can take form in a need to wield power over others, resulting in violence. Since most addicts don’t commit murder, even those journalists, biographers and historians who are addicts themselves don’t connect the dots between addiction and war.

Josef Stalin, arguably the worst murderer of all time, was not identified as an alcoholic by most of his biographers. However, James Graham demonstrates in The Secret History of Alcoholism that his behaviors were in fact fueled by alcoholic egomania. Most of Adolf Hitler’s biographers missed his addiction, even though a number of his closest confidants were outed as addicts; addicts often flock together. In their 1978 book, The Medical Casebook of Adolf Hitler, Leonard L. Heston and Renate Heston show his amphetamine use, which caused his Parkinson disease-like symptoms, to be the best explanation for his increasingly reckless and destructive behavior. Mao Tse-tung (aka Mao Zedong), who was responsible for the deaths of some 50-100 million Chinese, was outed as a barbiturate addict by his personal physician, Dr. Li Zhisui, in The Private Life of Chairman Mao.

Even when addictive drug use can’t be proved, horrendous misbehaviors indicate addiction. There is no direct proof that Pol Pot, who was responsible for the murder of about a third of his Cambodian countrymen, was an alcoholic; however, his horrific behaviors are consistent with the diagnosis. Proof exists of Che Guevarra’s alcoholism, but fortunately he never became head of state. On the other hand, he clearly influenced and was buddies with Fidel Castro, who was probably an amphetamine addict (try giving seven-hour speeches on just caffeine!). Castro, in turn, sent his henchmen to foment violent revolutions throughout Africa and Central and South America. Yasir Arafat, whose behaviors and pupil size in numerous pictures indicate amphetamine addiction (TAR # 4), acted similarly in the Middle East. A head of state inflicting massive pain on his own people or committing acts of aggression against others, or both, is most likely an undiagnosed addict. Such acts may also be committed by people who are not themselves addicts but instead profoundly influenced by addicts, even when well-intentioned.

Along these lines, I believe George W. Bush’s intervention in Iraq was with the best of intentions. Because Saddam Hussein and his sons, Uday and Qusay, were alcoholics, if there was any chance they had access to WMD or if there was a chance they committed even a third of the killings ascribed to his regime, all three should have been taken out.* When the war wasn’t going well, Bush’s 2007-2008 “surge,” engineered by General David Petraeus (featured in TAR # 72), brought an extraordinary relative peace to Iraq; American fatalities were below accidents in the U.S. military for entire the year. Only when the U.S. pulled out in 2011 was the stage set for the intractable problems now faced.

Troops were never removed from Germany or Japan after WWII, nor were they removed from Korea after the Korean War. This arguably has helped keep the peace in these countries, so far, for more than 60 years. Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor during the first four years of the George W. Bush administration who opposed our 2003 invasion of Iraq, wrote in 2008 that Iraq wouldn’t be ready to go on its own for quite a while and leaving prematurely would set the stage for the enormous problems the country is now facing.

It’s unfortunate that the war is now being reported as an unsupported farce that President Bush used to advance his own agenda. It’s important to look at the facts, as known pre-war:

Saddam, a Sunni Muslim: (1) committed genocide against Kurds, Shiites and Marsh Arabs; (2) was responsible for the deaths of 1 million of his own people, or 40,000 per year for each year he ruled Iraq; (3) attacked four of his neighbor countries; (4) paid bounties for suicide bombers on the West Bank; and (5) harbored known global terrorists.

Then-President Bill Clinton signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which supported regime change in Iraq, mainly because of the dangers of Saddam Hussein’s WMD.

In 2002, both houses of Congress voted overwhelmingly (296-133 in the House and 77-23 in the Senate) to pass a resolution authorizing Saddam’s removal by force. Senators Joe Biden, Harry Reid, Hillary Clinton and John Kerry gave impassioned speeches why we should depose Saddam. Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi lectured on the dangers of Saddam’s stockpiles of WMD. The war was legally authorized by many who now feign ignorance or who conveniently “forget” their personal support for the war.**

Along with 70% of Americans, both right-wing and left-wing journalists supported the war, from Fox News and George Will to Thomas Friedman and The New York Times.

In Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War, Los Angeles Times correspondent Bob Drogin shows that a single Iraqi defector, a chemical engineer code named “Curveball,” precipitated the 2003 Iraq invasion by inventing confabulated lies about weapons of mass destruction purportedly controlled by Saddam Hussein. U.S. President George W. Bush, a recovering poly-drug addict, spear-headed a war intended to take down the alcoholic Saddam. The great irony is Curveball is also an alcoholic.

In November 1999, Curveball found his way to Germany as an Iraqi defector seeking political asylum and hoping for “a huge house and…a gleaming Mercedes sedan with buttery soft leather seats” (already, a behavioral clue to Curveball’s addiction: grandiose expectations). Because German immigration granted asylum to only one in 25 applicants and everyone in Baghdad knew only those with good information were given red-carpet treatment, he offered valuable “secrets” of the Saddam regime. He told the German intelligence apparatus that Saddam had a secret program to churn out germ weapons.

Long before Curveball’s defection, the German intelligence agency BND and the American CIA learned to distrust each other. On one hand, the collapse of East Germany provided proof that Soviet bloc spies had “completely penetrated the upper echelons of West German intelligence.” On the other, “arrogant CIA experts patronized and insulted” the BND, with the CIA going so far as to set up a German station chief in Washington, DC for a fall from grace for supposedly passing out in a gay bar (which could have subjected him to blackmail), even though he was a notorious womanizer.

A former senior officer with the chief intelligence wing at the Pentagon that handled defectors, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), explained it’s difficult to “assess someone if you don’t see his face, his style, his mannerisms, what he’s saying, how he responds. All of that is very important in judging someone’s credibility.” However, the grudge the Germans held against the American intelligence services caused Curveball’s case officer to argue emphatically against letting his U.S. counterparts access to an important defector whom “he and his colleagues were perfectly capable of debriefing…without American help.”

Moreover, if a defector brought information that might reflect badly on Germany, the Germans’ reasons to refuse to allow others access were compounded. Curveball told his handlers that Saddam used German-manufactured equipment to build WMD. This was deeply embarrassing to Germans, who could suffer political ramifications if German companies, after building a poison gas factory for Libyan ruler Muammar Qaddafi and providing all sorts of components and expertise for Saddam before the Persian Gulf War in 1991, were again found to be providing anything that might be deemed similar to modern gas chambers. This could spell disaster to the intelligence experts working under the German national coordinator of intelligence, Ernst Uhrlau (who admitted to controlling underlings via tirades for which he became infamous and under whom, as a result, morale plummeted).

U.S. intelligence reluctantly came to accept the fact its agents would not be allowed to meet with Curveball and had to depend on the Germans.

Non-intelligence service German operatives with access to Curveball were simply scientists; they didn’t have a clue about reading people or how to properly interrogate. Curveball described a technically feasible system of mobile germ-brewing big-rigs, plausible for a regime bent on rebuilding a WMD program. There were many kernels of truth wrapped inside his confabulations. Gaps were explained away; he was a chemical engineer, not a microbiologist or weapons expert and couldn’t be expected to know everything.

Curveball supplied his German handlers with the answers they wanted. Translations from Arabic to German also caused intelligence bureaucrats to fill in gaps where something didn’t make perfect sense. In filling gaps, preconceived notions caused them to err on the side of “Saddam has WMD.” Translating to English increased the errors.

The Americans were impressed with the reports they read. Saddam had developed an extensive WMD program in the 1980s, which the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) destroyed after the 1991 war. It made sense that a megalomaniacal dictator would reconstruct what he could, when he could. Bioweapons were the perfect instrument because of their seemingly innocuous civilian applications, from medicine to pesticides. Spinning tales that others would believe was made still easier because “the Americans had failed to recruit a single Iraqi agent…who was close to Saddam’s illicit weapons programs.” By 1998, the U.S. had almost no human on-the-ground intelligence on Saddam or any WMD. The Americans were desperate to fill a void that Curveball was seen as being able to do.

Many intelligence operatives argued that Curveball’s “original information was so exquisitely detailed, so utterly persuasive, that it had to be true.” American intelligence sub-agencies seeking recognition reinforced this belief. Recognition can be important for bureaucrats, even when they are geeky scientists. A group called WINPAC, or Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control, “was supposed to streamline CIA reporting and analysis of weapons-related threats.” The tiny staff of six specializing in microscopic germs and viruses was suddenly deemed important, which gave them credibility and allowed them to push reports up to higher levels.

Curveball’s clearly “erratic behavior,” along with later denials of some of the information he had supplied, suggested to the German operatives they should no longer trust him. But these same operatives know that “memories are fungible, constantly changing….Clarity of recall can evaporate or reformulate in unexpected ways. So they ignored his denials, his backsliding and memory lapses.” Although “his drinking worsened,” they did not think Curveball was an alcoholic; instead, they figured he might be suffering from depression.

Addiction experts, had there been any working in the intelligence services, would have judged Curveball’s claims non-credible. Curveball gradually became a “nervous wreck” and his behavior became increasingly unpredictable. He drove German intelligence crazy, was “mentally unstable” and “drank too much.” He vanished for days at a time, postponed appointments at the last minute and even failed to show up for questioning. He exhibited roller coaster-like “wild mood swings.” He smoked incessantly and signs of paranoia began setting in. He was irresponsible both with money and with his life. Yet, he could switch to fawning charm and a great smile to get what he wanted.

During his stint as an informant, one American was allowed to meet with Curveball. The Germans tried to verify a story in which he may have witnessed an accidental leak of anthrax. Because he would have been vaccinated, he could be tested for antibodies in his blood. German doctors found the lab results inconclusive and asked an American doctor, “Les,” to take a look. While Les, too, couldn’t prove or disprove the presence of such antibodies, he wondered whether Curveball might be an alcoholic. Les later told a colleague, “It was early in the morning, he was hung over and he smelled like booze,” and worried why Curveball would show up for an important medical test with a “blistering hangover” and bloodshot eyes, sallow and sweaty skin and disheveled clothes from (apparently) being out all night. Les’ observations and Curveball’s behaviors are consistent with a diagnosis of alcoholism; as described in many stories of alcoholics in both Drunks, Drugs & Debits and How to Spot Hidden Alcoholics: Using Behavioral Clues to Recognize Addiction in its Early Stages, they are classic symptoms. Of course he was an alcoholic. Therefore, he should not have been trusted.

Aside from the fact that alcoholics, because of their need for control, can be great liars, why would those in both nations’ intelligence services—who frequently deal with liars—have believed him? Disbelief was suspended partly because other alcoholics—the German station chief and Uhrlau, the German national coordinator of intelligence—destroyed trust between U.S. and German agencies, preventing openness. In addition, “confirmation bias,” the tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions, helped conceal the truth (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases). Saddam previously had WMD and everyone knew he was a murderous despot. Why would he stop? Moreover, there was ample evidence of a British-trained microbiologist directing an Iraqi program to research anthrax and other deadly agents before the 1991 war. Dubbed “Dr. Germ,” she admitted Saddam had produced “horrific germ weapons,” which were ordered destroyed after 1991 rather than risk discovery. In the late ‘90s, the intelligence community assumed Saddam was again building germ weapons; all they needed was proof, which Curveball provided. The pieces of the puzzle all seemed to fit together, thanks to confirmation bias and an extremely convincing alcoholic, along with other alcoholics serving to stifle open communication. Without any obvious contradictions, the passage of time served only to cement this view.

When 9-11 happened, German intelligence was close to pulling the plug on Curveball. But the attacks gave more credence to Curveball’s confabulated claims. Despite strong doubts inside the CIA, the Bush White House linked Saddam to the direct attacks and al Qaeda terrorists in general. Bureaucrats and intelligence personnel looking for fame and recognition got in the way of sound analysis. Despite the fact that the Germans told the Americans they couldn’t validate Curveball’s stories and still wouldn’t give Americans access to him, WINPAC rediscovered the Curveball reports and latched onto his story of biological weapons. Drogin cited a skeptical intelligence chief’s analysis of WINPAC: “They figure the mobile weapons labs are their ticket to glory. They’re like a cult….It’s crazy.” And the chief of the European Division in the clandestine service, Tyler Drumheller, preferred to err on the side of caution, acknowledging sometimes even crazy guys turn out to be right. Besides, “the best liars always tell some truth.”

Despite concerns by many in German intelligence, they knew if they pulled the plug those at the very top would have to admit to a mistake. The skeptics would have walked the top guys off a cliff. The Germans could never admit Curveball wasn’t credible; if Curveball was found to be a liar after the Germans had spent a fortune debriefing and protecting him, someone in the German intelligence agency would be held accountable and agents—even top brass—would be fired. They felt forced to judge Curveball’s claims “credible.” This was further complicated by the fact that the U.S. publicly blamed the tragedy, “in part, on the ineptitude of German authorities. Three of the four 9/11 pilots, including Mohammed Atta, the ringleader, had lived up to nine years in Hamburg. They studied at technical colleges and formed an al Qaeda cell. Why didn’t the Germans stop them?” The Germans didn’t want to be blamed again.

In short, Curveball’s snowball had grown to an avalanche. By the time Colin Powell gave his speech in February 2003 on the reasons for invading Iraq, nothing was going to stop the momentum. Rhetoric rose in intensity. The authors of the National Intelligence Estimate report (NIE), which “represents the best collective judgment of the entire intelligence community,” had been given “clear marching orders” to assume the U.S. was going to war. The report, which would normally take up to ten months of drafts and rewrites, took only 19 days to complete. The section on Saddam’s biological warfare program was derived almost entirely from Curveball’s information. The rivalry between intelligence sections served only to push us inexorably to the brink, even as doubts on the intelligence increased.

Alcoholics in power often directly cause war. Curveball demonstrates that addicts can also indirectly cause war—likely from their convincing lies. If Curveball hadn’t got the snowball rolling, the 2003 invasion of Iraq may never have occurred. And right or wrong, Iraq would not be in the mess exacerbated by, as Brent Scowcraft warned against, U.S. troops leaving prematurely. While President Obama is likely not an alcoholic—even if he is the child of an alcoholic father and alcoholic step-father (discussed in TAR # 43)—the addictionologist must wonder how many of his close advisers might be compounding alcoholic lies with alcoholic incompetence.

* I tend toward non-interventionism in foreign affairs, but I believe alcoholic despots who have access to WMD must be removed from power and, barring the complete meltdown of U.S. power that seems to be occurring, the U.S. is the only country on the planet that can remove such despots. I have no problem with allowing our citizens to help take out other despots overseas, ventures for which are currently a state-enforced monopoly. On the other hand, intervention in Iraq’s affairs was done badly. I wrote in my client letter at the time (pp. 7-8 of issue # 15 at http://www.dougthorburn.com/newsbyedition.php, which is a terrific read) that if we were to give Iraqi citizens with diverse religious beliefs a stake in keeping the peace, the Iraqi oilfields should be privatized with equal ownership shares given to every Iraqi adult. Bush is a “big-government” conservative who, lacking an understanding of the role of private property in free markets, unfortunately didn’t do this.

** I wouldn’t be as pissed off about such lies and half-truths if I could prove addiction; among members of Congress, at least, it shows not every pathological liar is an addict and, therefore, addiction can’t explain every such misbehavior. However, there may be much more hidden addiction (House Speaker John Boehner is the most notable exception—his alcoholism is quite obvious) than 27 years ago, when Steven Waldman wrote his seminal piece, “Governing under the influence; Washington alcoholics: their aides protect them, the media shields them,” because of the public perception of alcoholism. Pills may have largely taken the place of booze. I would be shocked if there isn’t as much or more addiction among staffers.